Using the same pricing software as your rivals: what competition law says
Using the same pricing software as rivals is not automatically unlawful. Learn what competition law says about data pooling, court rulings, and vendor questions.
Contents
Key takeaways
- Sharing a pricing tool is not the legal question; pooling rivals' non-public data and agreeing to follow the output is.
- Article 4 of Law No. 4054 prohibits agreements, concerted practices and association decisions that fix prices or the elements of a price (mevzuat.gov.tr, Law No. 4054, Article 4, 7 November 2026).
- In Gibson v. Cendyn Group, No. 24-3576, the Ninth Circuit held on 15 August 2025 that competitors independently buying the same recommendation software, followed by higher prices, does not by itself state a Sherman Act claim.
- The same opinion says it would "undoubtedly" violate Section 1 for hotels to agree among themselves to follow a third party's pricing recommendations.
- Türkiye's Competition Board said in its Amazon Türkiye decision of 18 April 2025 that pricing algorithms can lower prices but also make monitoring, agreement and punishment of deviations easier.
Algorithmic pricing means software that sets or suggests room rates from data. Using the same tool as rivals is not automatically unlawful. What matters is whether the tool pools rivals' confidential data, and whether hotels agree to follow its output. Article 4 of Türkiye's Law No. 4054 bans price agreements and concerted practices.
A revenue manager sits through a demo of a rate tool that "reads the market", and the vendor mentions that most of the hotels in the region already use it. Two questions decide whether that is ordinary software or a legal problem: whose data produces the number, and what have the hotels agreed to do with it. After reading, you will know which mode of algorithmic pricing your contract buys, what the courts and the Turkish Competition Board have actually said, and which questions to send the vendor in writing before you sign.
What is algorithmic pricing, in plain words?
Algorithmic pricing is software that sets or suggests prices from rules and data, with either a person or the software making the final call. The legal question is not the algorithm itself; it is where the data comes from and what the hotels using it have agreed to do.
Separate three modes and find out which one your contract buys. In rule-based mode you set the floor, ceiling and rules, and the software applies them. In recommendation mode the software suggests and a revenue manager approves. In automatic mode the software applies changes within limits you set. The difference matters because the more the software decides, the more you need to know about its inputs.
| Mode | Who makes the final call | What to check in the contract |
|---|---|---|
| Rule-based | Hotel sets floor, ceiling and rules; software applies them | Limits are enforced in the system, not only in a document |
| Recommendation | Revenue manager approves each change | Approval is logged; vendor reports approval rates |
| Automatic | Software applies within limits | The limits, the change log, and the option to switch to approval mode |
Keep algorithmic pricing apart from dynamic pricing in hotels and who sets the rates. Dynamic pricing is the commercial practice of varying rates with demand; algorithmic pricing describes who or what produces the number. A hotel can price dynamically on a spreadsheet, and a hotel can run an algorithm that never varies its price.
A tool is not risky because it is shared. It becomes a competition issue when it carries other hotels' non-public data, or when the contract or the habit of the team turns a suggestion into a common price. Ask what the software optimizes: your own revenue, a market-level target, or a target defined across all its clients in your area. The answer belongs in writing.
Ask whether the tool is a rule set with a scoring layer, and ask for a plain description of the calculation, in sentences, not a dashboard. Then write down who approves a change and how often the team approves without reading. Approval that is automatic in practice is automatic in effect.
What did the US court decide in Gibson v. Cendyn?
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the guests' claim, holding that competing hotels independently buying licences for the same recommendation software, followed by higher prices, does not by itself state a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The case is Gibson v. Cendyn Group, LLC, No. 24-3576, an opinion by Judge Bea filed on 15 August 2025, brought by a putative class of Las Vegas Strip hotel guests (United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, opinion, 15 August 2025 (opens in a new tab)).
The court's reason was causation. Section 1 requires a causal link between the contested agreement and a restraint of trade in the relevant market. Several competitors choosing the same provider, plus higher prices, is not enough to require rule-of-reason scrutiny.
The caveats matter more than the headline. The plaintiffs dropped their hub-and-spoke argument on appeal, so the court did not address an alleged agreement among the hotels to follow the recommendations. The plaintiffs did not allege that the software pooled, shared or used one hotel's confidential information in recommendations made to another hotel. And the court said it would "undoubtedly" violate Section 1 for competing hotels to agree among themselves to follow a third party's pricing recommendations, with non-binding recommendations offering no protection. It also expressly declined to decide whether delegating binding pricing decisions to a third party is a restraint of trade.
Watch outA dismissal is not permission
Read the decision as a statement about what the plaintiffs alleged, not as a safe harbor. The court left open the two situations most relevant to hotels: an agreement to follow the recommendations, and a tool that moves one hotel's confidential data into another hotel's price.
This is US federal law and a decision about whether a claim was properly stated. It does not interpret Law No. 4054 and it is not a safe harbor for a Turkish hotel.
What does Turkish competition law prohibit?
Article 4 of Law No. 4054 prohibits agreements between undertakings, concerted practices, and decisions and practices of associations of undertakings that have as their object or effect the prevention, distortion or restriction of competition, including fixing prices or the elements that make up a price (Cumhurbaşkanlığı Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi, Law No. 4054, Article 4 (opens in a new tab)).
The article lists the cases it covers: fixing the purchase or sale price of goods or services, the elements that make up the price such as cost and profit, and any purchase or sale conditions; sharing markets or market resources; and controlling supply or demand. The object-or-effect structure matters. If the object is price fixing, the authority does not have to show the harm; a conversation that never produced a higher rate can still be the infringement.
The presumption matters most in daily hotel life. Where an agreement cannot be proven, price changes or market conditions resembling those in markets where competition is restricted create a presumption of a concerted practice. The escape route is evidence, not explanation: each party can rebut the presumption by proving, on economic and rational facts, that it did not engage in a concerted practice. "We all use the same tool" invites the next question rather than closing it.
Associations are inside the article, not beside it. A regional hotel association that recommends rates, or circulates a rate survey for members to align on, is making a decision of an association of undertakings.
The Board has already examined pricing terms in this market. In decision 17-01/12-4 of 5 January 2017 it ruled that price and room-availability parity clauses and best-price-guarantee terms in a major online booking platform's contracts with accommodation facilities infringed Article 4, and it fined the platform (Rekabet Kurumu, final decision announcement, 5 January 2017 (opens in a new tab)). For what those clauses mean in practice, see rate parity clauses and what the official decisions say.
None of this decides whether any particular tool is lawful. That depends on the facts of your contract and your conduct, and belongs with your legal adviser.
Key pointThe sentence to remember
When an agreement cannot be proven, parallel price behavior can create a presumption of a concerted practice, and the hotel then has to rebut it with economic and rational facts.
What has the Competition Board said about pricing algorithms?
In its Amazon Türkiye decision of 18 April 2025, the Board said pricing algorithms can bring lower prices, but because they automate decisions and increase transparency they also make it easier for competitors to monitor each other, agree, and punish deviations. The decision is 25-15/348-164, file 2023-1-038, and it examined an automatic pricing mechanism offered to sellers on a multi-category e-marketplace (Rekabet Kurumu, decision 25-15/348-164, 18 April 2025 (opens in a new tab)).
The Board accepted the benefit side: pricing algorithms can produce lower prices, and the technology is not unlawful in itself. The risk side is transparency plus automation. Competitors can watch each other, reach an agreement on price and other strategic factors, observe deviations and retaliate. That can produce information exchanges, secret agreements or concerted practices.
The Board added a point aimed directly at shared vendors: competitors choosing the same third-party algorithm instead of developing their own may have the potential to give rise to collusion. On responsibility, it set a threshold: a user of a third party's anticompetitive algorithm must at least be aware of that conduct or be able to reasonably foresee it. A vendor's public claims about what the tool does are part of what you could foresee.
The Board also said algorithmic pricing may not amount to an infringement by object in every case. It unanimously found that Amazon Türkiye had not infringed Article 4 and that no administrative fine was needed, and the decision records the company's statement that the mechanism would be closed in Türkiye as of 10 February 2025. Read the reasoning as a framework for any shared pricing tool, hotels included. It is not a finding about hotels, and it does not settle your case.
| Signal | Why the Board's reasoning makes it matter |
|---|---|
| The tool is used by hotels that compete with each other | Shared use is where the collusion potential begins |
| The tool raises market transparency | Transparency makes monitoring and agreement easier |
| The tool automates the decision rather than informing a person | Automation removes the step where a person diverges |
| The hotel cannot say which inputs produced a number | You cannot foresee what you cannot describe |
| The same vendor serves most of a small comp set | A common recommendation approaches a common price |
| The hotel has agreed, formally or in practice, to follow the output | Agreement is the element Article 4 needs |
Public data, your own data, pooled data: why the difference matters
A tool fed by public data and your own numbers is a calculation. A tool fed by rivals' non-public data is a channel between competitors, and the channel can be the problem even when nobody agreed to anything.
Public data is your competitors' published rates, public event calendars and published tourism statistics. Everyone can see it, so using it is ordinary market intelligence. Your own data is your bookings, pace, cancellations, costs and guest mix, and nothing leaves the hotel in a form that identifies a rival.
Pooled or confidential data is the category that changes the legal character of the tool: other hotels' forward rates, occupancy, pick-up, discount practice or willingness to pay, or the recommendations the tool gives them. The mechanism is uncertainty reduction. Exchanging forward-looking, non-public data removes the guesswork that competition is supposed to create, and the exchange itself can be a concerted practice without a written agreement or a meeting.
Ask about aggregation thresholds: at how many contributing hotels does a pooled figure appear, and can a participant be identified from it? In a small resort comp set, "aggregated" can still be one hotel's number. Watch correlation too. The same tool, the same default settings and the same comp set produce similar prices, which is exactly the pattern that feeds the Article 4 presumption, even where nothing was agreed. For how to define that set fairly, see choosing a competitive set and comparing rates fairly.
The practical test: take one rate suggestion and write down where each input came from. If you cannot, you cannot answer a regulator's first question.
NoteRisk depends on the hotel, not only the tool
The same tool can be low risk for one hotel and high risk for another, because the answer depends on the comp set, the aggregation threshold and what the hotel has agreed to do with the output.
What should you ask the vendor before you sign?
Ask for the data inputs in writing, and for the contract to state whether recommendations are advisory or binding. Then take both answers to your legal adviser before the renewal date, not after.
ChecklistSend the questions by email and keep the reply
- List of data inputs per recommendation
- Whether any other hotel's non-public data is used, directly or inside a model
- Aggregation threshold and identification risk in a small market
- Number of the vendor's clients in our comp set
- Advisory or automatic, and who approves each change
- Whether the contract requires, rewards or assumes following the output
- Export of the rules and the change history
- Data return and deletion on exit
A clause that obliges you to follow output is the clause counsel will want to read. So is the comp set question: a vendor that serves most of a small market is a different proposition from one that serves a handful. For the day-to-day side of reading suggestions, see what a revenue manager should check in AI rate recommendations.
Three questions belong to counsel rather than the vendor: does your comp set definition itself create an exchange, does participation in a shared benchmark create exposure, and what record should the hotel keep of approvals?
What are the everyday risks, even without software?
Most Article 4 exposure in hotels comes from conversations rather than code: price talk with neighboring hotels and rate discussions inside associations.
Association meetings are covered. Decisions and practices of associations of undertakings fall under Article 4, so a recommended minimum rate or a members' rate survey discussed in the room is the classic risk, whatever the minutes say. Informal channels count the same: general manager messaging groups, phone calls between neighbors, front-desk conversations about what the hotel across the street is charging next season.
Benchmark participation is an exchange. Sending your forward rates into a pool and receiving rivals' in return is the mechanism, and receiving is enough to be part of it. The safe subjects are your own costs, your own demand signals and public data. The unsafe subjects are future prices, discounts, capacity, and who will take which segment or group.
Give revenue staff a three-line rule: we discuss our own numbers, we do not discuss future prices with competitors, and we leave and record if the conversation turns. Record keeping is your defense. A short dated note of who was present and what you said is worth more than a recollection two years later.
TipA card for the revenue desk
One page, three lines: our own numbers, public data, no future prices with competitors. Below them, a blank line for the date, the meeting and the person to inform if a conversation turns.
What to do next
Before the next demo or contract renewal, send the vendor the data questions above in writing and put the answers in front of counsel. The parts of this article fit together as one test. A tool is a calculation when it uses public data and your own; it is a channel when it carries rivals' non-public data; it is an agreement when hotels commit to follow it. Only the first is comfortably outside Article 4.
Frequently asked questions
Is algorithmic pricing illegal for hotels?
No, not as such. The Competition Board accepted in its Amazon Türkiye decision of 18 April 2025 that pricing algorithms can bring lower prices, and said algorithmic pricing may not be an infringement by object in every case. The risk depends on the data the tool carries and on whether hotels agree to follow its output. Confirm your own case with a legal adviser.
What is algorithmic collusion?
It is coordination between competitors produced through pricing algorithms rather than meetings: a shared tool that carries rivals' non-public data, or a common vendor whose recommendations most of a market follows. The Board's reasoning in decision 25-15/348-164 describes the mechanism as transparency plus automation, which makes monitoring, agreement and retaliation easier.
Does Gibson v. Cendyn mean hotels can share pricing software safely?
No. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a dismissal because the plaintiffs did not plead a causal link between an agreement and a restraint, and it left open an agreement among hotels to follow recommendations and any pooling of confidential data. It also said an agreement to follow a third party's recommendations would "undoubtedly" violate Section 1. It is US law and does not interpret Law No. 4054.
Can hotels discuss rates at an association meeting?
No. Decisions and practices of associations of undertakings fall under Article 4 of Law No. 4054, and where an agreement cannot be proven, parallel price behavior can create a presumption of a concerted practice. A recommended rate or a members' rate survey is the classic example. Leave the discussion and keep a dated note.
What data may a revenue tool use?
Public data and the hotel's own data are ordinary inputs. The sensitive category is other hotels' non-public, forward-looking data: rates, occupancy, pick-up and discount practice. Ask the vendor for the input list, the aggregation threshold and whether you can be identified inside a small comp set, and keep the reply.
Sources
- Rekabetin Korunması Hakkında Kanun (Law No. 4054), Article 4 (opens in a new tab)Cumhurbaşkanlığı Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi (mevzuat.gov.tr)mevzuat.gov.tr
- Rekabet Kurulu Kararı, Dosya 2023-1-038, Karar 25-15/348-164 (18.04.2025), Amazon Turkey otomatik fiyatlandırma mekanizması (opens in a new tab)Rekabet Kurumu (rekabet.gov.tr)rekabet.gov.tr
- Gibson v. Cendyn Group, LLC, No. 24-3576, Opinion (9th Cir. 15 August 2025) (opens in a new tab)United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuitcdn.ca9.uscourts.gov